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THE NEW SECURITY DRAMA IN EAST ASIA
The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners to China’s Rise
Evan S. Medeiros
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To understand and evaluate these evolving dynamics, the RAND Corporation conducted a year-long study of the responses of U.S. allies and security
3
partners in East Asia. The study sought to answer four questions: How have
these nations responded to China? What forces are driving these reactions? How
will the drivers change? What are the implications for American regional security interests? The study examined the responses to China of the five U.S. allies in
4
the Asia-Pacific and of Singapore, a major security partner. The RAND study
analyzed the responses of these six nations in four areas: domestic politics and
public opinion, economic policy, foreign policy, and defense policy. This
structure allowed the study to explore a range of national responses as well as
responses across each functional area (e.g., defense policy), generating conclusions about both country-specific and regionwide responses to China. This article highlights the most salient findings from this research.
OVERALL REGIONAL RESPONSES TO CHINA’S RISE
In contrast to much of the current research, China’s growing presence and interactions with U.S. allies and security partners are not fundamentally transforming the security order in the Asia-Pacific. China is having an influence on these
relationships, but these changes are not as rapid or comprehensive as many
presume.
First, the foundation of the U.S. alliances in Asia continues to endure. No allies or major security partners see China as a viable strategic alternative to the
United States. The United States remains the security partner of choice, largely
because it is the one nation seen as possessing the capability and resolve to balance China. Its allies and partners prefer that Washington do the “heavy lifting”
of deterring China and, ultimately, preventing Chinese domination of regional
affairs. U.S. allies are all intensely pursuing engagement strategies with China,
driven principally by an economic logic. They want to benefit from China’s large
and growing economy, especially during the current global recession. But these
goals exist alongside concerns about China’s long-term intentions, particularly
its military modernization plans. A recent project by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies that uniquely polled elites throughout Asia confirmed this
duality. The study found that China was ranked first as the “greatest threat to
peace and stability in the next 10 years” and second as the “greatest force for
5
peace and stability” in the next ten years.
Second, China is affecting American relationships with its allies and security
partners. On the one hand, China’s rise makes some U.S. security commitments
more relevant. These countries can interact with China more confidently because they know (and Chinese leaders see) that the U.S. commitments to them
and to involvement in Asia continue. On the other hand, allies and partners are
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also positioning themselves to benefit from both the United States and China.
This is a recalibration more than a transformation. None of these nations want
to choose between the United States and China, and all reject having to make
such a choice. Also, some of these nations use their interactions with China to
generate leverage in dealings with the United States. Some of the smaller, middle
powers in East Asia, like the Philippines and Thailand, have attempted such
strategies. On balance, U.S. allies and security partners want continued American involvement in the region but sometimes only in certain ways, at certain
times, and on particular issues.
Third, China is undoubtedly gaining influence with U.S. allies and partners
in East Asia—in the defined sense of looming larger in their economic, diplomatic, and defense policies decisions. This is a natural and inevitable trend.
The key question is how it is manifesting itself in these states’ regional behaviors. Our research found that U.S. allies and partners in Asia have become
more sensitive to some of China’s preferences and interests, especially on
China’s self-identified “core interests” (hexin liyi), which now include both
6
Taiwan and Tibet. There have been several instances in which specific nations
have canceled visits and changed policies on these issues due to Chinese intervention. But this too is not terribly surprising. Sovereignty issues resonate with
many postcolonial states in Asia and, more important, changes in Taiwan or Tibet policy are seldom costly for these states in the sense of undermining their
material interests. Thus, these behaviors are not leading indicators of wholesale
accommodation to China.
A related indicator of Chinese influence on these states is that Beijing has
been effective at precluding the emergence of “anti-China” containment efforts,
to the extent that there was ever a push for such an approach. China has been effective at accumulating “defensive influence,” persuading nations to avoid taking actions China deems to be threatening. There is very little evidence that
China has accumulated “offensive influence,” in the sense of policies that could
effectively degrade or dismantle U.S. alliances or security partnerships in the region. In the late 1990s, China tried and failed to offer an alternative regional security architecture, with the promotion of its “New Security Concept.” Few
nations were interested, or now are, in jumping onto this strategic bandwagon,
even in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 and the disillusionment
with American responses to it. More recent Chinese attempts to push U.S. allies
have backfired, alienating regional states and enhancing their coordination with
the United States. Prominent examples include Singapore in 2004 and South
7
Korea in 2006.
In assessing China’s rise in East Asia, two additional considerations are noteworthy. First, China’s growing presence and interactions in the region do not
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directly translate into influence—that is, using incentives and sanctions to alter
other states’ behavior. Many analysts too often mistake presence for influence.
The fact that countries are trading more with China and negotiating with it in
regional organizations does not, ipso facto, imply that China can change these
states’ policies, especially when policy changes require a state to compromise its
material interests.
Second, the regional consensus favoring engagement with China has a tentative quality. There is creeping uncertainty about China’s future: some nations
fear a weak China, and some fear a strong China. Few are willing to bet their futures on Beijing’s assurances about a “peaceful rise.” China’s large and growing
economy (even during the current global recession) is not a geopolitical “tractor
beam.” While China’s economy looms large for all nations, fears of China as a
competitive threat have motivated much diversification in trade relations. There
are nagging concerns among regional leaders about Chinese military modernization. As People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities improve, such as with
the likely future deployment of China’s first aircraft carrier, and as the PLA conducts more out-of-area operations, these nagging concerns could evolve into
closer security coordination with the United States and its allies. The recent
statement of concern about China’s growing defense budget by South Korea’s
president during new security consultations with Australia is instructive in this
regard.
A final regional response to China’s rise is a nonevent—the lack of a regional
rush, over the last decade, to increase military budgets and modernize conventional forces in response to concerns about China’s military. The military budgets of Japan and South Korea have remained relatively flat in real terms, with
gradual increases in South Korean defense spending. Southeast Asian militaries’
budgets did not substantially increase either in the last decade; many just returned to the spending levels of the period prior to the Asian financial crisis (see
figures 1 and 2). There are even some notable examples of a deep atrophy in external defense capabilities, such as in the Philippines. That said, Asia could be on
the cusp of a limited change in this past trend. Australia’s recently released defense white paper calls for a substantial increase in naval capabilities, especially
submarines, in reaction to China’s sustained naval expansion and the Chinese
navy’s growing presence in the South and East China seas. But most East Asian
states are not likely to initiate major procurement programs in the next five
years; many are suffering from the global economic crisis, allocating scarce government resources to much-needed economic stimulus programs.
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FIGURE 1
TOTAL DEFENSE BUDGETS IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA, 1997–2007

Source: The data for figures 1 and 2 are from Australia Defence Intelligence Organization, Defence Economic Trends in the
Asia-Pacific (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2007), available at www.defence.gov.au/dio/documents/2007_DET.pdf.

FIGURE 2
DEFENSE BUDGETS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1997–2007

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC REACTIONS TO CHINA
The particular responses of individual countries provide greater texture for understanding these trends.8 Those of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia are summarized below.
Japan
The rise of China in East Asia has clearly stirred Japan’s competitive impulses, but
its posture toward China remains characterized by considerable ambivalence and
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marked by growing anxiety. Many Japanese leaders are more willing than in the
past to cite China explicitly as a potential military threat, and the two countries
have engaged in heated disputes over territorial boundaries, historical issues, and
regional leadership. These three sets of issues will drive competition between
China and Japan in the coming years. Japan has edged closer to the United
States and strengthened ties with other regional states, from India to Australia
to Taiwan—moves that are increasingly justified by reference to China. Tokyo
has also demonstrated a new willingness to use its military forces to, for example, patrol ocean areas disputed with Beijing.
At the same time, Japan’s businessmen and economic planners remain convinced that their nation’s economic well-being is tied to continued trade and investment with China. This remains the case during the current global recession;
many in Japan viewed China as having pulled it out of the last recession, which
began in the 1990s, and as being able to pull it out of the current one as well. A
broad alliance of business, political, and media actors have supported the outreach to China since the prime ministership (2001–2006) of Junichiro Koizumi,
and Beijing has reciprocated by taking a more conciliatory posture. Many strategists and politicians also foresee damage to Japan’s position in Asia should a cold
war develop between Tokyo and Beijing.
The long-term prognosis for Sino-Japanese relations is highly uncertain, and
there are certainly grounds for concern about future instability. For the first
time, both China and Japan are unified internally, possess substantial and growing economic and military capabilities, and are capable of influencing events beyond their borders. At the same time, the United States is pushing for Japan to
assume a larger global role, especially in military terms. Domestically, the demise of the Socialist Party during the mid-1990s nudged the political center of
domestic politics to the right. Japan’s emergence from fifteen years of sluggish
economic growth helped usher in the rise of nationalist sentiments that remain
today. At the same time, a new breed of popular politicians has challenged the
long-dominant bureaucracy for control of national policy, including foreign
policy.
South Korea
The most basic—but not the most complete—answer to the question of what is
driving South Korea’s response to China is a generally benign view of China and
the perceived economic benefits of stable relations with it. Given these conditions, there is considerable sensitivity toward China in South Korea today and
reluctance either to challenge major Chinese interests or needlessly stimulate
Chinese sensitivities. At the same time, growing concerns and anxieties about
Chinese economic policy making and diplomacy show that the honeymoon in
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China–South Korean relations is decidedly over. The forces holding the relationship back, if not driving it in the opposite direction, include uncertainties about
China’s medium- to long-term intentions (especially regarding China’s military
modernization and its growing influence in North Korea), awareness of potential South Korean vulnerability to Chinese economic or other pressure, a widely
shared awareness of the importance of the United States, and a continuing gap
between South Korean aspirations and capabilities.
These cross-pressures suggest that, first, South Korea will continue to expand ties with China, with trade and investment leading the charge to the extent possible during a global recession. South Korea is likely to emphasize
solving actual problems between the two countries, such as implementing
confidence and security-building measures that could improve prospects for
peace on the Korean Peninsula. By geography alone, sensitivity toward some
Chinese interests will remain a characteristic of South Korean policies. Furthermore, the irritants in and constraints on the relationship will also continue, and an occasional spike in tensions is to be expected. As China continues
to ensconce itself in North Korea, issues pertaining to the North could come to
have as many negatives as positives for bilateral relations. Even short of this, a
new strategic alignment between South Korea and China is not likely, in the
absence of some major external event. South Korea will likely seek to maintain
good relations with China on the basis of—rather than instead of—a continued close alliance with the United States. Another North Korean nuclear test,
or clear Chinese unwillingness or inability to bring the North to resolve the
nuclear issue peacefully, would reinforce this inclination.
This mixed picture suggests that barring unexpected developments, South
Korea will stick with the United States, even at critical decision points that test
the U.S.–South Korean alliance, as was the case with American Iraq policy. For
Washington the real policy challenge is that China’s rise may complicate its efforts to expand U.S.–South Korean security cooperation. Domestic politics in
Seoul will strongly influence this. South Korean agreement to participate in
American military operations based out of its homeland will be particularly difficult to obtain, although this will depend heavily on the context in Korean domestic politics, bilateral relations, and international relations. The key to the
future of the relationship will be reconfiguring the alliance correctly.
The Philippines
The Philippines’ response to China is strongly defined by the country’s fundamental and myriad weaknesses. Chronic political instability, debilitating domestic insurgencies, and deteriorating external defense capabilities have left the
Philippines unable to ensure stability within the main islands, let alone to
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protect its offshore territorial claims vis-à-vis China. These weaknesses have
spurred Philippine efforts to reestablish close defense ties with the United States,
mainly to cope with its own severe internal security challenges. Philippine leaders no longer view China as a major security threat, as they did in the mid-1990s.
This ambivalence about China has been reflected in a severe atrophy of Philippine air and naval capabilities in the last five to ten years. However, distrust of
China’s ultimate intentions remains and is growing in some quarters, driven in
part by domestic politics. Since 2007, China policy has emerged as a politically
sensitive issue, constraining Manila’s engagement with Beijing and lubricating
interaction with Washington. Rebuilding of the Philippines’ external defense capabilities remains a long-term goal, however.
The Philippine economy is less dependent on trade with China (and on international trade, more generally) than are the economies of some of its Southeast Asia neighbors (e.g., Singapore and Thailand). Like other Asian
economies, however, China has become a major destination for Philippine exports, which motivates a perception that trade with China is important to the
Philippines’ future economic growth. This calculation could be changing as
the China-centered processing trade rapidly declines due to the current global
recession. A broad consensus in the Philippines over China’s importance as an
economic partner has, for the past five years, helped to strengthen bilateral
ties. Yet the view that China is an important future economic partner is mixed
with an incipient sense that China is also a competitive economic threat.
While there are forces driving the Philippines’ response to China, it is important to stress that these forces are not “driving” Philippine policy anywhere in particular. The leadership is heavily focused on internal challenges,
and the public is relatively inattentive to China and, for that matter, most
other foreign-policy issues. To the extent that China has gained popular and
elite attention, it has been linked to politically charged corruption scandals
that fuel popular concerns about becoming too close to China.
Thailand
Thailand has a long tradition of “bending with the wind.” In today’s East Asia,
that means accommodating—and seeking advantage from—both China and
the United States. Among the six nations examined in the RAND study, Thailand was the most likely and willing to accommodate China. Thaksin
Shinawatra, the former prime minister, modified this approach by trying to
“blow the wind” as well as bend with it. He strengthened political and military,
as well as economic, ties with China at the same time as he was taking bold new
steps to buttress Bangkok’s alliance with the United States. His successors, however, have returned to a more muted style of foreign policy—to the extent they
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have the time or resources to focus on foreign policy amid sustained political instability. The post-Thaksin governments have de-emphasized bold initiatives,
particularly on the strategic and military fronts, and have refocused Bangkok’s
diplomacy on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Absent the
reemergence of a political leader with a strong foreign policy vision and the political space to pursue it, Bangkok will continue to deepen gradually its economic, political, and, to a lesser extent, military relationships with Beijing, as
well as with Washington.
While Thai foreign policy has seldom been all in one direction, several
long-term trends suggest that relations with China have become more important to Thailand in the last decade. China’s value as a trade and investment partner has grown substantially, but recent declines in trade with China could alter
this calculation. Thailand has acquired some military hardware from China, and
the two nations have conducted two joint military exercises. But these trends
pale in comparison to the scope of Thailand’s economic and security cooperation with the United States.
There are also limits to the Thai-Chinese relationship. Despite Thailand’s
past efforts to engage Burma (thereby removing a source of tension with
Beijing), Burma’s recent instability has once again made it an issue between
Beijing and Bangkok. Thai leaders are intensely focused on establishing stability
at home, a seemingly endless task since the 2006 coup. When they do focus on
foreign policy, they state that they are committed to a balanced posture between
China and the United States. Thai policy makers recognize the long-standing
material and symbolic benefits of the U.S. alliance. Bangkok is also working to
develop options with other countries. Economically, it has strengthened ties
with India, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Politically and militarily, it cooperates with India, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, as well as with the United
States and China.
China’s regional behavior will be the largest variable in the evolution of Thai
attitudes toward the rise of China; China has been heavy-handed with Thailand
regarding its interaction with Taiwan and Tibet authorities. Events in Burma,
the success or failure of ongoing negotiations with the United States and Japan
for free trade agreements, and the future of political reform in Thailand are also
important variables, albeit less widely appreciated ones.
Singapore
Singapore shows less ambivalence about the rise of China than do most Southeast Asian countries. The country’s small size, geostrategic vulnerability, and
continuing concerns about long-term Chinese intentions propel it toward a
close, strategic relationship with the United States, despite its close ethnic links
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to China. Singaporean leaders see the United States as both the principal stabilizer in East Asia and the only realistic counterweight to potential Chinese assertiveness. Keeping the United States actively engaged and forward deployed in the
region is a central Singaporean objective. China’s rise, the spread of Islamic extremism, and heightened concerns about stability in neighboring countries have
prompted Singapore to strengthen security cooperation further with the United
States. At the same time, Singapore has expanded security links with the United
Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and other nations with stakes in Asia’s stability.
The benefits Singapore receives from increasing trade and investment with
China, as well as from China’s broader economic integration in the region, also
drive bilateral relations. These policies are balanced, however, by Singapore’s
corresponding efforts to diversify its economic relationships to avoid excessive
dependence on China. Singapore is doing so by negotiating a range of free trade
agreements, in particular with Japan and the United States, as a means of countering China’s intensive economic diplomacy; this also helps Singapore entrench
the former countries economically in Southeast Asia.
Because of the relative clarity of Singapore’s long-term vision, the future of
Singapore’s relationship with China has a greater level of certainty than that of
any other Southeast Asian nation. As China becomes more powerful,
Singaporean leaders will do everything they can to ensure a continued balance
of power in the region, one in which China does not dominate economic or security affairs. This strategy will almost surely guarantee continued close diplomatic and security relations with the United States and other U.S. allies.
However, in the absence of unprovoked Chinese aggression, Singapore will neither encourage nor support “containment” or an explicitly “anti-China” balancing coalition.
Australia
There are distinct cross-pressures in Australian-Chinese relations. First, rapidly
growing merchandise trade (mainly in natural resources) and the perception
among Australian policy makers that China is key to future prosperity have been
the major drivers of bilateral relations. Second, few in Australia see conflict with
China as likely or inevitable. Australia wants to avoid being drawn into a regional rivalry with China. Third, Australian policy makers possess a deep uncertainty, mixed with a growing concern, about China’s role in Asian economic and
security affairs. Recent Chinese investments in Australia’s resource sector have
prompted a debate about overreliance on China. Beijing’s diplomatic activism,
especially in the South Pacific, and its military modernization are generating
worries among Australian policy makers and strategists.
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How will these cross-pressures play out? Canberra will continue to expand its
bilateral relations with Beijing, with economic ties at the fore, albeit more tentatively than in the past ten years. Concerns about Chinese investment in Australia
and limited access of Australian businesses to key sectors of China’s economy are
now emerging. As China looms larger in Australia’s foreign policy, Canberra will
continue to be sensitive to, and will accommodate, some of Beijing’s interests,
such as its policies on Taiwan. Australia’s concerns about China’s diplomatic and
military behaviors in Asia will persist. This in turn will limit the expansion of
Chinese-Australian relations and enable greater alliance cooperation with both
the United States and other regional powers. Australia’s recent security-policy
coordination with Japan and South Korea is notable in this regard.
Under the John Howard administration (1996–2007), Australia’s concerns
about China motivated a series of foreign and defense policies that expanded alliance cooperation and sought to ensure that the United States would remain
highly influential in the Asia-Pacific region. The new Labor Party government,
led by Kevin Rudd, has pursued a similar approach. Rudd chose to distinguish
his foreign policy from that of his predecessor on global issues—such as Iraq
policy, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change—rather than on China
policy. Kevin Rudd has made it clear that while China may be an increasingly important “partner” for Australia, the United States is a “strategic ally.” He believes
that a strong alliance bolsters Australia’s position in Asia and that the alliance
contributes to broader regional stability.
A new and more complex stage in Australia’s relations with China (and the
United States) began this year with the publication in May 2009 of a new defense
9
white paper, which is Rudd’s first and the nation’s first since 2000. This important document cited China’s improving power-projection capabilities and uncertainty about both American defense capabilities and the U.S. role in Asia to
justify a significant increase in defense procurement. The white paper called for
acquiring up to twelve conventional submarines, additional amphibious lift,
10
and land-attack cruise missiles (among other items). Unsurprisingly, Beijing
reacted negatively to this assessment, assuming that this procurement was directed at countering Chinese military capabilities. Washington continues to digest the explicit and implicit messages from one of its most stalwart allies in the
Asia-Pacific. American strategists should be concerned that some in Australia
view U.S. defense strategy and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s proposed
cuts as indicating an eventual inability to maintain robust power projection into
11
the western Pacific.
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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
The global financial crisis and resulting recession raise numerous questions
about economic and security relationships in the Asia-Pacific, including about
China’s relative influence over U.S. allies and partners. Many commentators
have speculated that the current crisis is a strategic tipping point akin to the era
just after World War II in which the United States eclipsed Britain as the global
economic hegemon. I would recommend much caution in accepting such dire
assessments.
First, it is far too early to make such grandiose conclusions about the effects of
the crisis on the global balance of power. It remains uncertain how severe and
lasting the crisis will be, especially among East Asian economies. Key questions
remain unanswered: Who will be hurt the most? Who will recover the fastest,
and how? Which states or institutions will help East Asian states recover? It is
likely that both the United States and China will play roles—individually, jointly,
and in concert with international organizations.
Second, it is uncertain that this crisis increases China’s economic clout while
diminishing that of the United States. China’s economy was challenged by the
crisis in ways that highlight existing questions about the sustainability of its current growth model, which emphasizes exports and investment over consumption. The steep declines in aggregate external demand from the United States
and European Union (EU) triggered rapid and dramatic declines in China’s exports and imports beginning in fall 2008. This in turn led to a reduction in exports as a driver of growth, leaving consumption and investment to carry much
of the load. This is the first time in the last thirty years that China has experienced a sustained and deep decline in total trade. The economic effects—both
direct and indirect—of this on employment and trade-related investment are
highly uncertain. This could prove to be a constraint on Beijing’s ability to sustain a moderate level of growth while stimulating greater domestic demand.
Beijing is addressing its predicament through a four-trillion-RMB stimulus
package, which seeks to increase internal demand (e.g., consumption and investment) to replace the loss of external demand (e.g., exports). The stimulus
package is facilitated by a wave of spending financed by central and local government on infrastructure and real estate projects. (Total bank lending in the first
quarter of 2009 was more than in all of 2008!) To boost internal demand, Beijing
is making added efforts to stimulate domestic consumption, especially in the rural areas, as part of its economic restructuring and, ultimately, the rebalancing of
the Chinese economy. Analyses by major international investment banks indicate that China’s initial stimulus is working, which has led many of them to revise upward their estimates of Chinese growth in gross domestic product from
around 6.5 percent to 7.0–7.5 percent for 2009. In other words, China will

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss4/5

12

Medeiros: The New Security Drama in East Asia—The Responses of U.S. Allies
MEDEIROS

49

almost certainly recover from the crisis faster than the United States and other
major Western economies.
But China’s approach may not be as beneficial to its economy as initial indicators suggest; time will tell. China’s direct and indirect stimulus spending is
probably not sustainable for more than two or three years, given the scope of
deficit spending and related bank loans. Government-directed bank lending
has been so intensive in 2009 alone that many now worry that China is fueling
a new wave of bad debts, which would gut the last round of successful bank reform, initiated in the late 1990s. A key determinant of China’s success will be
its ability to stimulate domestic consumption as a driver of growth and not
simply rely on government-funded investment in order to transition from a
short-term policy response to global recession to a long-term strategy for sus12
tainable growth.
Lastly, it remains decidedly unclear that China’s projected quick recovery will
aid struggling East Asian economies. China’s stimulus package may not position
it to emerge as a new engine of regional prosperity. In other words, China will
not necessarily be East Asia’s economic savior. Due to the declines in Chinese
imports and exports (as a result of recessions in the United States and EU), the
regional network of processing trade in East Asia seems to be unraveling. Asian
economies that are both trade dependent and heavily involved in processing
trade with China—namely, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, and
some South Korean sectors—will not enjoy the benefits of stimulus-driven
growth in China. These economies are suffering the most right now, and unlike
after the Asian financial crisis, they cannot simply export their way to renewed
growth. By contrast, regional economies whose trade with China is in capital
goods and commodities, such as Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and other sectors in
South Korea, will benefit from China’s stimulus package. This situation could,
over time, result in an adjustment in some regional perceptions of the perils of
overreliance on trade with China, leading to diversification in trading partners
and bilateral relations.
China does possess an important economic tool that it could use to be viewed
once again as the fulcrum of regional growth: outward direct investment. China
has the world’s largest foreign-exchange reserves, and as a result of reforms initiated in the late 1990s, its major banks and some corporations are de-leveraged
and quite profitable—at least for now. Thus, the government has substantial financial resources it could use to invest in East Asia and globally. As the United
States and Japan found in past decades, investment in countries can, over time,
produce political influence by employing local people and creating a political
constituency in favor of the investing nation. There are incipient indicators that
China is ramping up its overseas investments—taking advantage of cheap prices
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and needy companies. For example, China has accelerated its acquisition of
ownership stakes in resource-producing companies in Australia, Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Brazil. Chinese outward direct investment will be an important
variable to watch in assessing its mechanisms and channels for translating economic capabilities into political influence.
WHICH WAY WILL THEY GO?
The preceding analysis suggests several preliminary conclusions about this
evolving geopolitical drama in East Asia. These conclusions represent neither a
climax nor a denouement but a developing plotline.
First, the United States remains well positioned to achieve its long-standing
regional objectives, however the Barack Obama administration chooses to characterize them. The United States does not face a crisis of confidence, and the
foundations of its influence endure. It is still early days in Asia’s response to
China; most countries are still coming to terms with what it means for China to
be a more influential actor. This has prompted an abundance of reactions, including many contradictory ones. Accordingly, there is still abundant
geopolitical space for Washington to expand and improve its security partnerships in the region. If the United States is to do so, its Asia policy needs persistent
attention. Although the George W. Bush administration’s Asia policy left the region in fine condition, renovation of regional relationships is needed. In the face
of China’s rise (as well as the growing prominence of India and Japan), the
United States needs to improve the legitimacy of its role and the credibility of its
commitments in the Asia-Pacific. That effort will require an adaptation to the
changing constellation of the equities of U.S. allies and security partners. None
want to provoke China or be drawn into a containment effort; none want China
to dominate the region; none want the United States to leave or even substantially draw down its presence; and all want China to play a major role in managing regional challenges. American policy needs to reflect these changing
regional realities.
A second major finding of RAND’s work on regional reactions to China was
that there was no strong correlation between high levels of economic integration
with China and accommodation of it. Japan, Singapore, and Australia all have
large, growing, and highly complementary trade and investment relations with
China. Their trade with China represents a larger share of their total world trade
than that of other East Asian nations, and the business communities in these
countries have been, on balance, bullish about China.
However, this is not reflected in their foreign and security policy making in
any direct manner. Policy makers in all three nations harbor deep uncertainty
about China’s future and have growing concerns about its emergence as a
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regional security threat. The governments in all three countries have responded
in part by enhancing their alliance links with the United States, each other, and
others in Asia. Australia has begun to improve its regional power-projection capabilities in particular ways. A distinct diplomatic priority in all three nations is
ensuring that the United States remains active and influential in East Asia, so
that China does not dominate. For Tokyo and Canberra, Chinese defense modernization is increasingly a factor in their military procurement and planning, a
set of assumptions that is poised to become more prominent as the PLA deploys
additional power-projection capabilities and increasingly operates outside
China’s littoral.
A third important finding is that domestic politics matters a lot in determining nations’ responses to China’s rise. For most East Asian states, China’s
rise generates a variety of contradictory reactions, some drawing them toward
China and others making them wary. What determines which way they go? A
key independent variable is domestic politics. The political conditions in East
Asian nations and, especially, the views of political leaders mediate the extent
to which diplomatic and economic interactions with China result in accommodation of China, alienation from the United States, or both. The changes in
South Korean responses to China following the 2008 election of Lee
Myung-bak offer a prominent example. Although relations with China had
not fundamentally changed by early 2008, President Lee reoriented South Korea more toward the United States and created a permissive environment for
questioning Korea’s growing reliance on China. Lee has now positioned South
Korea as yet another medium-sized regional power raising concerns about
Chinese military modernization. Ultimately, the perspectives and preferences
of these nations’ top leaders will have a defining influence on how they respond to the myriad of challenges posed by China as well as by U.S. policy in
East Asia.

NOTES
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World War II, and they view its current presence as outdated, given the alleged acceleration in regionalism. See Kishore Mahbubani,
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Asia-Pacific: Australia, Japan, the Republic of
Korea (South Korea), the Philippines, and
Thailand.
5. Bates Gill, Michael Green, Kiyoto Tsuji, and
William Watts, Strategic Views on Asian Regionalism: Survey Results and Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, February 2009), pp.
4–7.
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Brookings Institution” (Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2008),
available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/.
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harsh rhetoric raised alarm bells in Singapore
about China’s growing assertiveness. In response, Singapore subsequently took several
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warned South Korean policy makers to restrict the geographic scope of operations for
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Korean foreign policy and China’s growing
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